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Implementing Public Sector Accruals in OECD Member States: Major Issues and 
Challenges  




Drawing on extended new institutional theory, this paper has striven to make heard the voices 
of accountants, budget officers, and policy makers involved in implementing public sector 
accruals in different OECD member states. Such voices of the organisational actors and the 
challenges that they are encountering in the process of implementing accrual accounting and 
budgeting in their specific settings are missing in the existing public sector accruals literature. 
The empirical findings of the study demonstrate that the political and technical ambiguities in 
implementing public sector accruals across countries are much broader than outlined in the 
academic work and presented in the reports and studies of the proponents. Such challenges, 
when cascaded down to the organisational level, have brought about vast uncertainty and 
confusion amongst most of the budget and treasury officers who deal with public sector 
accruals in their specific jurisdictions, threatening the legitimacy at the organisational level. 
More communication and collaboration amongst the actors at institutional, organisational-
field and organisational levels are therefore needed to build a coherent body of knowledge in 
facilitating public sector accruals reforms across countries. 
 




The aim of this paper is to explore the major challenges involved in implementing public 
sector accruals in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
member countries. We look at the concerns of key organisational actors of OECD member 
states, the majority of whom are senior accountants from treasuries and budget officers, as 
well as policy makers from ministries or governmental bodies directly involved in developing 
or implementing accrual accounting and budgeting reforms in their respective jurisdictions. 
The OECD represents a propitious research setting of accrual accounting experiences since 
the vast majority of its members are developed countries, EU members and the major 
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adopters of accrual accounting and budgeting at a global level (Blöndal, 2003). The 
organisation is perhaps the best representative of a global trend in public sector accruals.  
Implementing accrual accounting in OECD member states has become a key part of 
realising public sector financial reforms, which are collectively referred to as New Public 
Management (NPM) and New Public Financial Management (NPFM) reforms (Hood, 1995; 
Guthrie, Olson, & Humphrey, 1999). As part of improving public sector governance 
(Almquist, Grossi, van Helden, & Reichard, 2013), the OECD has advocated the adoption of 
accrual accounting for its member countries (Blöndal, 2003, 2004). Member states’ attempts 
at replacing their cash accounting with accrual accounting are considered to be inevitable, 
particularly in the evolving sovereign debt crisis. Such efforts are hailed as major 
achievements in managing public expenditures more effectively and efficiently (Lapsley, 
Mussari, & Paulsson, 2009; Pollanen & Loiselle-Lapointe, 2012). Similar assertions relating 
to the supremacy of accrual accounting to budgetary accounting in terms of improving 
transparency in resource allocation, identifying full costs of governments’ activities, and 
engendering high quality statistics, i.e. the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and the 
European System of Accounts (ESA), which are crucial for fiscal and spending decisions, 
have been made by international organisations [e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank], regional policy makers [e.g. the European Commission (EC)], 
international accounting and auditing standards setters [e.g. the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) and the EUROSTAT], and professional accounting associations and 
accounting firms [e.g. the Federation of European Accountants (FEE), the Chartered Institute 
of Public Finance & Accountancy (CIPFA), Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC)], all of which are considered to be major proponents of public sector accruals (see e.g. 
IFAC, 2011; PwC, 2013; FEE, 2007).  
 
Despite this support, many of these proponents have also cautioned the implementation of 
accrual accounting in the public sector, given its technical ambiguities and the amount of 
resources and expertise that the countries should make available to address them (IFAC, 
2011; FEE, 2007). For instance, professional associations, standards setters and firms of 
auditors or accountants have expressed several reservations with regard to the adoption of 
accrual accounting and International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSASs) by the 
EU member states (European Commission, 2012). Within the academic community, the 
move towards accrual accounting has been a debated reform trajectory (Carlin, 2005). While 
some academics are apparently convinced of the benefits of accrual accounting (see e.g 
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Annesi-Pessina & Steccolini, 2007; Likierman, 2003; Ball, 2012; Bergmann, 2012; 
Caperchione, 2006; Lüder & Jones, 2003), others have raised concerns over the pertinence of 
business-like accrual accounting in public entities, which have different objectives and 
contexts (see e.g. Guthrie, 1998; Mellett, 2002; Carlin, 2005; Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen, & 
Lapsley, 2014; Monsen, 2002; Becker, Jagalla, & Skærbæk, 2014; Connolly & Hyndman, 
2006). The latter group is of the view that the implementation of accrual accounting is driven 
more by legitimacy than efficiency reasons and that the benefits of accrual accounting are 
overstated.  
 
The arguments for and against the implementation of public sector accruals - uttered by 
international organisations, policy makers, standards setters, professional accountants and 
academics-are claimed to be normative and lacking empirical evidence (Jagalla, Becker, & 
Weber, 2011; Lapsley, Mussari, & Paulsson, 2009). For example, there is apparently a gap 
between what is normatively expected from accrual accounting and what has been achieved 
in its implementation at different organisational levels in practice (Guthrie, 1998). This is 
evident in countries such as Australia and the UK - the early adopters of accrual accounting 
and budgeting - given the time and resources consumed in the implementation (Guthrie, 
1998; Connolly & Hyndman, 2006; Hyndman & Connolly, 2011). Missing from the public 
sector accrual literature, however, are the voices of actors at the organisational level, 
primarily government accountants, budget officers and policy makers, who are actually 
involved in implementing accrual accounting. Questions that are yet to be answered in the 
public sector accrual literature include how such organisational actors are advancing public 
sector accruals reforms in their specific settings, the strategies and mechanisms they are 
deploying and the specific challenges that they are encountering in the implementation 
process.  
 
This paper strives to fill this knowledge gap in the public sector accrual literature. We 
seeks to make heard the voices of accountants, budget officers, and policy makers involved in 
implementing various aspects of accrual accounting and budgeting in different OECD 
member states. This is approached through the extended version of neo-institutional theory, 
also referred to as new institutionalism (Carruthers, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), 
particularly the version that acknowledges the role of intra-organisational actors in the 
institutionalisation process. Some aspects of a framework proposed by Dillard, Rigsby, & 
Goodman (2004) have been adopted. This angle allows us to delineate how the public sector 
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accrual ideas and practices cascade down through different levels, in particular the economic 
and political level (i.e. the OECD), the organisational-field level (i.e. OECD member states), 
and the organisational level (i.e. actors in different OECD member states), prior to their 
adoption in particular contexts.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The ideas of new institutionalism, 
which provide a sensitising lens for this study, are presented in Section 2. The research 
method is outlined thereafter. Section 4 presents the views and experiences of OECD member 
states with regard to public sector accruals and the challenges they have encountered in 
implementing different elements of accrual accounting, budgeting and IPSASs in their 
specific contexts. The final section analyses the implementation of public sector accruals in 
the member states in the light of the theory, and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Theoretical framework: extended new institutionalism 
 
Public sector accounting scholars have striven to theorise accounting changes using varied 
sociological approaches (see e.g. Jacobs, 2012; Van Helden, Johnsen, & Vakkuri, 2008; 
Goddard, 2010). For instance, several pieces of research have drawn on the ideas of actor 
network theory, in particular the concept of translation (see e.g. Latour, 1987; Callon, 1986) 
to analyse how accounting changes (see e.g. Justensen & Mouritsen, 2011) and the ways in 
which innovations, through a network of human and non-human allies, have taken place in 
the health care sector (Preston, Cooper, & Coombs, 1992; Chua, 1995; Lowe, 2000) as well 
as in other public sector settings (Christenen & Skærbæk, 2007, 2010; Lukka & Vinnari, 
2014). The widespread adoption of accrual accounting in the public sector has nevertheless 
been predominantly associated with the ideas of new institutionalism (Modell, 2013; Jacobs, 
2012). Many theoretical perspectives have failed to explain accounting changes with 
reference to external variables/environment, which have increasingly become dominant in 
regulating accounting practices at a global level. Implicit in neo-institutional theory (see e.g. 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) is the role of external 
organisations/institutions, for instance, the IFAC, the European Commission, and the OECD 
amongst others, in disseminating public sector accounting reforms (Jacobs, 2012). The extent 
public sector accounting literature has therefore drawn on neo-institutional theory to 
investigate how similar reform ideas (i.e. accrual accounting and the IPSASs) have been 
diffused across countries, although there are significant variations in reform outcomes, i.e. 
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practice variations (Ahn, Jacobs, Lim, & Moon, 2014; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Ezzamel, 
Hyndman, Johnsen, Lapsley, & Pallot, 2007; Pollanen & Loiselle-Lapointe, 2012; Hyndman 
& Connolly, 2011; Oulasvirta, 2014).  
 
The ideas of new institutionalism have primarily drawn on the notions of “legitimacy” and 
“isomorphism” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It is stated that 
organisations tend to conform to socially accepted norms and structures as part of their 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour, and in the process become isomorphic. DiMaggio & Powell 
(1983) mention three pressures/mechanisms contributing to organisational isomorphism, i.e. 
coercive, mimetic, and normative. While the coercive mechanism, especially in the public 
sector, has been linked to state intervention and pressure from resource providers, the 
normative mechanism has been seen as an outcome of professionalisation (e.g. through the 
influence of consultants, scholars or other esteemed professionals). The mimetic mechanism 
is concerned with emulating the ubiquitous practices in the field which have a tag of being 
successful and modern. A stream of public sector literature draws on these three mechanisms 
to explain how the adoption of accrual accounting has become an integral element of 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour, thereby illuminating the case of accounting choices within 
organisations (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Adhikari, Kuruppu, & Matilal, 2013; Irvine, 2008; 
Ball & Craig, 2010). Ensuring legitimacy has been indispensable for public sector entities, 
not only to avoid critical questions regarding their activities but also to portray their image as 
modern and rational organisations in their operating contexts. However, Hyndman & 
Connolly (2011: 38) have differentiated between organisations/countries in terms of their 
concerns over legitimacy. They argue that the early adopters of accrual accounting in the 
public sector, i.e. New Zealand, Australia and the UK, were to a large extent motivated by 
technical economy efficiency gains, but that the later adopters were more concerned with 
legitimacy and involved in “mindless imitation fuelled by anxiety-driven pressures to 
conform”. 
 
Ahn, Jacobs, Lim, & Moon (2014) argue that recent new-institutionalism-based studies in 
the public sector have given more attention to unfolding heterogeneities in reforms than to 
organisational isomorphism. Public sector entities have increasingly becoming divergent in 
the process of implementing reforms (Modell, 2013; Jones, Lande, Lüder, & Portal, 2013). 
One way to depict such heterogeneities in reforms has been to recognise the internal 
dynamics and the role of internal actors, at different organisational levels, in the reform 
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process (Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen, Lapsley, & Pallot, 2007). In fact, this lack of focus on 
human agents and their actions within organisations has been a key weakness of the earlier 
institutional-based studies (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & 
Gonzalez, 2006). Recent studies drawing on new institutionalism have therefore 
acknowledged that the support and competence of organisational actors (for instance, 
bureaucrats and accountants) can play a vital role in the 
institutionalisation/deinstitutionalisation of public sector accounting reforms in a specific 
context (Hyndman & Connolly, 2011; Pollanen & Loiselle-Lapointe, 2012; Adhikari, 
Kuruppu, & Matilal, 2013). Claims have been made that it is due to the involvement of actors 
at different levels that organisations respond differently to similar reforms, leading to diverse 
outcomes.  
 
Studies have striven to address this drawback of neo-institutional theory and to identify the 
varying effects of organisational actors/individuals in the institutionalisation process, not 
least by combining institutional theory with other theories, for instance, the work of Bourdieu 
(Ahn, Jacobs, Lim, & Moon, 2014). Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman (2004), for instance, 
applied a three-layer organisational structure framework to unfold the issues of power, 
structures, and duality in the institutionalisation process. We draw on this notion of three-
layer organisational structure framework (see e.g. Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004), but 
apply it differently. In our study, the framework is used to unravel how the ideas and 
practices of public sector accruals have cascaded down from the OECD to member states, 
and then on to organisational actors in individual member states. At the macro level of our 
structure (i.e. the economic and political level) there are policy makers (i.e. the OECD and 
the European Commission), accounting standards setters (i.e. the IFAC’s International Public 
Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) and the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), and international organisations (i.e. the IMF and the Eurostat); 
actors/organisations propagating public sector accruals in the member states and providing 
guidance on its implementation. We have divided the micro level into two categories, the 
organisational-field level and organisational level. The organisational-field level consists of 
member states. Lower down is the organisational level, the term we have used to refer to 
senior accountants, budget officers and policy makers; i.e. the attendees of the OECD accrual 
accounting symposiums, who are involved in implementing accrual accounting and 
budgeting in their contexts. It is at this level that the ideas of public sector accruals tend to 
translate into actual practices and become institutionalised. We argue that the use of this 
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structure will allow us to study the response of most of the OECD member states to public 
sector accruals, and the challenges that the organisational actors at different hierarchies are 
encountering in implementing accrual accounting and budgeting in their specific 
jurisdictions. 
 
3. Research setting, data collection and analysis 
 
3.1. An overview of the annual public sector accruals symposium 
 
The research site of our study is the annual OECD public sector accruals symposiums. As 
part of its attempt at encouraging member states to adopt accrual accounting and budgeting, 
the OECD has been organising an annual accrual accounting symposium since 2001 (see 
Appendix A for the members list). The symposium is meant to bring about the challenges that 
the member countries have encountered in making a transition towards and in implementing 
public sector accruals (Blöndal, 2003). Some non-member countries, which have either 
adopted or are in the process of adopting accrual accounting, are also invited to participate in 
the symposiums and are provided with the opportunity to share their experiences with the 
member states. Our review of the presentation slides uploaded on the OECD website and the 
list of participants provided by the OECD shows that the majority of the attendees in the 
symposiums are treasury officers, senior accountants, budget officers and policy makers 
involved either directly or indirectly in implementing accrual accounting and budgeting in 
their respective countries. Along with country representatives, there are representatives from 
the standards setters, regulators, and international organisations such as the European 
Commission, the IASB, the IPSASB, the IMF, the EUROSTAT, and the World Bank, 
amongst others, attending the symposiums on a regular basis and updating the member states 
with their ongoing activities and projects. In this regard, the annual symposiums have 
provided a forum for accounting practitioners, budget officers, policy makers and standard 
setters in which they gather annually to discuss various aspects of public sector accruals. We 
have witnessed that many issues relating to public sector accruals discussed in earlier 
symposiums, for instance, conceptual framework, service concession arrangements and 
financial instruments, had later been converted into an exposure draft and subsequently to a 
standard. In addition, we have also noticed that some of the participants who had represented 
their countries (e.g. Australia and New Zealand) in one or more symposiums had later been 
nominated in the Board of the IPSASB. This is some of the evidence demonstrating the 
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influence that the symposiums have in developing and promoting public sector accruals at a 
global level.  
 
3.2. Data collection 
 
We adopted a triangular approach to data collection, encompassing document analysis, 
observation of the annual accrual accounting symposiums, and informal discussions with the 
attendees of the symposiums. At the outset we reviewed documents, mainly the presentation 
slides and the reports presented by the participants in the symposiums. Our aim in reviewing 
these documents was not only to grasp insights into the emerging accrual accounting reform 
issues in the member states, but also to identify those topics that had repeatedly been brought 
forth for discussion in the subsequent symposiums. This helped us to highlight the 
areas/topics within public sector accruals that are of concern to the representatives of the 
member states, international organisations and standard setters. 
 
Next, we attended the annual symposiums consistently from 2008 to 2011 and observed 
the discussions that took place in those four symposiums. The symposium is normally 
organised in the first week of March each year and lasts for two days. We had permission 
from the head of the OECD budgeting and public expenditure division to observe the sessions 
and attend the social events. However, we were prohibited to conduct formal interviews with 
the participants. We took notes in each session, elaborating on the issues embedded in the 
presentation slides, handouts and reports that were distributed to the participants during the 
meetings and later made available on the website. 
 
Our other approach to gathering data was to talk informally with the delegates during the 
coffee and lunch breaks as well as at the reception, which is usually held on the first day of 
the symposium. Altogether we talked (both jointly and individually) to more than 35 
delegates representing the member states, standard setters and international organisations 
during our four years of observation. The duration of these conversations ranged from 10 to 
45 minutes, depending on the settings (i.e. whether it was before or after the sessions 
officially started or ended, or took place during a coffee break, reception, lunch or dinner). 
We attempted to recall and transcribe the major issues immediately after each conversation. 
Our aim during the conversations had been to incorporate the views of all types of actors and 
countries represented in the symposiums. The OECD has, on the basis of financial statements 
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prepared by the member states, identified four stages in the development of accrual 
accounting, i.e. full accrual basis, modified accrual basis, cash basis with supplementary 
accrual data, and cash basis (see e.g. Blöndal, 2003; Carlin, 2005), and has placed the 
member states in one of these four categories. We selected representatives from each 
category for a discussion and asked them about the ongoing development in public sector 
accruals in their jurisdictions, their future agenda and plans, and the challenges they had 
faced and achievements made in facilitating public sector accruals reforms. Although the 
representatives had divided opinions based on the stages their countries were in implementing 
changes, we experienced that the opinions of the attendees representing a particular group 
had remained more or less stable during our observation periods. While the countries of the 
full accrual basis category, for instance Australia and New Zealand, had consistently 
remained strong supporters of public sector accruals, other countries seemed to not be fully 
convinced by the merits of the accrual basis in that they had adopted only some 
degree/elements of accruals, and mainly for financial reporting. 
 
We were aware of the fact that the situation might have changed in some countries since 
our last observation, which took place in 2011. To get updated information of the progress 
made by the member states in embracing public sector accruals, we reviewed the slides, 
documents, and annotated agenda presented in the subsequent symposiums by accessing the 
OECD website. There has been an increase in recent years in the number of member states 
adopting some elements of accruals in their financial reporting. However, we observed that 
the number of countries that have adopted full accruals both for reporting and budgeting has 
remained constant in this period. We also noticed that that the topics/issues incorporated on 
the agenda for discussion have to a large extent remained stable in the last few years. We 
have reasoned that this is an indicator that the challenges intertied to public sector accruals 
are yet to be resolved, and that the progresses made in tackling these issues have been slow.  
 
 3.3. Data analysis 
 
We began our data analysis by separating issues in public sector accruals that had been 
discussed repeatedly in the OECD symposiums. Overall we identified three themes/issues 
that had consistently emerged in the discussions in the symposiums for more than three years: 
“the implementation of accrual accounting, “the significance of accrual budgeting” and “the 
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applicability of IPSASs”. The data representing each theme were then clustered and attempts 
were made to establish links between these themes so as to create narratives.  
 
Given the fact that our approach to data collection was informal talks, we decided to 
maintain the anonymity of the countries. To represent the views of most of the member states 
and to compare their opinions, we followed Hood (1995) by grouping the member states into 
three categories, i.e. high-intensity accrual adopters, medium-intensity accrual adopters and 
low-intensity accrual adopters (Appendix B) (see also Hyndman & Connolly, 2011; Guthrie, 
Olson, & Humphrey, 1999). In addition, we added a new category, i.e. new accrual adopters, 
to represent non-members who have recently embarked on accrual accounting reforms. Our 
grouping also corresponds to the OECD attempt’s at dividing its member states based on their 
stages in adopting public sector accruals As stated in the extant literature (Grossi & 
Soverchia, 2011; Benito, Brusca, & Montesinos, 2007; Pina & Torres, 2003; Lüder & Jones, 
2003; Pina, Torres, & Yetano, 2009; Christiaens, Vanhee, Manes-Ross, Aversano, & 
Cauwenberge, 2014), classifying countries based on their government accounting systems is 
not an easy task given the diversity in their operating context and the varied objectives of 
government accounting across countries. We argue that the sole purpose of our classification 
was to bring about the views of most member states who were at different states in reforming 
their accounting and budgeting at central government levels. For instance, the high-intensity 
group consists of countries such as Australia, the UK, and New Zealand, which have, 
according to Blöndal (2015) adopted full accruals for both financial reporting and 
appropriations. While the medium-intensity group represents the countries which have 
adopted some elements of accruals at their central government levels either for reporting and 
budgeting or for both, the low-intensity adopters are those who are predominately adhering to 
the cash basis at the central level (few of them however provide supplementary accrual 
accounting information) (see Appendix B for details). Given the fact that our categories are 
based on the development at central government levels, they may vary if we consider the 
adoption of accrual accounting in agencies and at local levels. 
 
Regarding the limitations of the study, one limitation is that it does not cover all the topics 
that were discussed in the symposiums. For example, in each symposium there were some 
emerging issues; we noticed that most of these issues, such as social accounting and the 
global financial crisis either petered out over time or were replaced with other similar issues. 
We also excluded the updates of the IPSASB and the IASB, and the reports of the IMF and 
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Eurostat because they were predominantly oriented toward the future and were general rather 
than addressing country-specific issues. Another limitation of our study is that we were 
prohibited from making formalised interviews. However, we believe this disadvantage is less 
severe when seen in relation to the total amount of data we collected through our 
triangulation approach over the four consecutive years. Finally, we believe that being able to 
collect data through observations was particularly important as this enabled us to capture the 
practitioners’ viewpoints as they naturally emerged through debate, rather than having the 
issue artificially being introduced such as in a formal interview setting. 
 
4. Empirical section 
 
Drawing on our informal discussions, the document search and observation of the OECD 
public sector accruals symposiums, we have identified three main areas that the policy 
makers, budget and account officers, and treasurers of the OECD member states have 
perceived as major challenges in implementing public sector accruals in their specific 
contexts; “the implementation of accrual accounting, “the significance of accrual budgeting” 
and “the applicability of IPSASs”. 
 
 4.1. The implementation of accrual accounting 
 
The OECD has considered the accrual basis of accounting an important component of its 
governance reforms (Blöndal, 2003). It has become an active player in the promotion and 
dissemination of public sector accruals not least within its member states but at a global level. 
For instance, the OECD is one of the observers of the IPSASB and has recently, together with 
the World Bank and the IMF, chaired a review group created to purpose future governance 
and oversight arrangements for the IPSASB (IPSASB, 2014). It has also liaised with the 
European Commission, the IMF, the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(INTOSAI) and the big four auditing firms, amongst others, to facilitate research in areas 
such as the harmonisation of public sector accounting, the promotion of good practices in 
accounting and auditing, and governance reforms of the IPSASB (IMF, 2003; IPSASB, 
2014). That the European Commission has announced the development of European Public 
Sector Accounting Standards (EPSASs) and the fact that more than half of the member 
countries of the OECD come from the EU, means that the organisation may have even a 
greater impact in deciding on public sector accruals related issues in the future. 
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In his presentation at the 15th annual symposium, Blöndal (2015) states that 25 out of the 
34 OECD member states have now adopted either full or some elements of accruals in full in 
their financial reporting. Full accruals indicate that the member countries have been preparing 
consolidated statements for “Whole of Government Accounts” (WGA), although the 
controlling entities incorporated in such accounts vary amongst countries (OECD, 2013). We 
noticed during our observations and informal talks that the institutional pressures for the 
OECD and EU member states to adopt public sector accruals have significantly increased 
over the last few years. Organisations such as the OECD, the EU and the IFAC, a key player 
at the economic and political level, are of the view that the continuation of the outdated cash 
accounting and budgeting in this era of austerity would inevitably lead to dire consequences 
for the long-term sustainability of the member states (see also Ball, 2012; Ball & Pflugrath, 
2012). These organisations, together with the global accounting firms such as PwC (see e.g. 
PwC, 2013), have moved beyond simply recommending accrual accounting and budgeting 
towards addressing issues which they have perceived to be a major challenge to their 
implementation; for instance preparing WGA, developing and approving a conceptual 
framework, and projecting long-term sustainability, to name but a few. Albeit the adoption of 
public sector accruals is still voluntary, the institutional pressures being exerted by these 
organisations and other proponents for their adoption have increasingly resembled a 
characteristic of coercion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This was also evident in the following 
statement made by a Technical Director of the European Commission at the 11th accrual 
symposium: 
“We require all candidates for entry into the EU to adopt an accrual basis of 
accounting. [Otherwise] how is it possible to demonstrate the impact of austerities on a 
government’s cash flows, social benefits, and fiscal sustainability?” 
 
Despite such institutional pressures, we observed that the implementation of accrual 
accounting has remained both politically and technically a challenging endeavor in the 
majority of the OECD member states.  
 
4.1.1. Political challenges 
 
The public finance system in many central European countries has been different to the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition given the centralisation of power over the budget (Pina, Torres, & 
Yetano, 2009). On this basis it has been predicated that only Anglo-Saxon countries and 
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those with Western minister-style parliaments are better equipped to implement reforms such 
as accrual accounting, which requires, amongst other things, the delegation of power to 
different government units (Newberry, 2015). The fact that the legislature parliament has 
already delegated financial powers to the executive government means that reforms that 
require power to be delegated may not be considered a significant transformation in such 
countries. Treasuries and finance ministries have therefore emerged as the key drivers of 
public sector accruals in Anglo-Saxon countries, and this political backing to instigate 
reforms has allowed the bureaucrats in these countries to develop a detailed implementation 
plan for reforms without giving much attention to the costs. A Chief Account Advisor at the 
Treasury of an Anglo-Saxon country (a high-intensity adopter) at the 8th symposium 
remarked: 
“We had a clear mandate and political backing for accrual accounting reforms. We 
therefore did not think much about the costs of transition. We adopted a phased approach, 
i.e. moving on by demonstrating achievements and building confidence on accruals. We 
also used ‘dry runs’ to resolve the issues that remained contentious, for instance, 
identifying public entities”. 
 
Such was not the case however, in the majority of medium and slow-intensity adopters of 
public sector accruals. During our informal discussions, the representatives of many low and 
medium-intensity adopters stated that the politicians in their countries had been reluctant to 
delegate their inherent financial power to agencies. They had also raised concerns over cost-
related issues and questioned the relevance of public sector accruals in their jurisdictions. 
That many European politicians are reticent towards accrual accounting given the costs 
incurred in their implementation is evident in the bulk of academic work (Caperrchione, 
Salvatori & Benghi, 2014; Brusca, Montesinos, & Chow, 2013). It is worth mentioning that 
accounting in some OECD member states, primarily the German-speaking countries and 
Norway, had traditionally been more than just recoding cash receipts and payments. These 
countries had adhered to an advanced budgetary accounting, the so-called ‘cameralistic 
accounting’ (see e.g. Monsen, 2002, 2008), which had a particular focus on money 
management, budgetary control and payment control. The system allowed the governments to 
record and report events that occurred in different budgetary stages and not the cash receipts 
and payments, which are considered to be the last stage in the budget process. Monsen (2008) 
argues that a developed version of cameral accounting could provide government entities 
with the same type of information which the accrual basis of accounting was meant for. This 
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has also been envisaged as a reason why some OECD member states, for instance, Germany 
and Norway tend to leave the traditional budget structure unchanged rather than pursing 
expensive accrual accounting reforms (Jones, Lande, Luder, & Portal, 2013). Portal, Lande, 
Jones, & Lüder, (2012) state that some central European countries have retained their 
traditional budget accounting as a system of parliamentary appropriations, even if they have 
adopted accrual-based financial reporting reforms.  
 
Costs related to accrual accounting transition have also drawn the attention of international 
organisations and professional accounting firms (PwC, 2013; IFAC, 2011). For instance, in 
its report, the European Commission (2013) has assumed that the costs of moving away from 
a cash-based accounting system to an accruals-based accounting system for the central 
government alone in a medium-sized member could reach up to EUR 50 million given the 
expense of putting into place the new standards, the associated IT systems, and appropriate 
training and education. In the same report, it is mentioned that France spent in excess of EUR 
1,500 million on articulating accrual accounting and budgeting reforms over the last decade. 
During our informal talks, the representatives of low and medium-intensity adopters 
mentioned that they had to spend a lot of time elucidating the politicians and parliamentarians 
as to the importance of accrual accounting, and how it would help improve transparency and 
accountability in public finance. In some countries the budget and treasury officers were even 
forced to revise and alter their transition plan towards accruals. A Senior Accountant at the 
Department of Treasury of one medium-intensity adopter shared his experienced at the 8th 
symposium: 
“To satisfy the politicians and parliamentarians, we agreed to facilitate the reforms a bit 
easier, i.e. [we proposed a] cash budget with some accruals modification and accrual 
accounting for reporting at the federal level. These efforts helped a lot – they approved 
both the transition plan and the costs.”  
 
The new accrual adopters, many of which are emerging countries, are apparently prone to 
underestimate the transition costs of public sector accruals. As stated by Brusca, Montesinos, 
& Chow (2013), there is a tendency amongst many countries, in particular emerging 
countries to mimic the supposedly best accounting practices adopted by developed countries 
and international organisations. As part of reflecting the modernity (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983), many emerging countries (new accrual adopters) had adopted a big-bang approach to 
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accruals, i.e. adopting full accruals both for financial reporting and appropriations at all 
administrative levels (Ernst & Young, 2012). However, given the costs incurred in the 
transition process, some of these countries had been forced to move back and adopt a step-by-
step approach to reforms. A Director from a Treasury Bureau of the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance representing an Asian country (a new accrual adopter) remarked on the step-by-step 
approach during the 11th accrual symposium: 
“We were so eager to follow the reform paths pursued by the Anglo-Saxon countries. In 
2010 we had to appoint and dispatch 70 CPAs to support the financial statements of our 
line ministries. We spent so much money on trainings and other preparatory activities in 
the field. We changed our big-bang approach later and decided to start the reforms from 
the ministries.” 
 
During our observations and informal discussions, representatives of many member states 
also raised concerns over the costs incurred in creating awareness of the merits of accrual 
accounting to other users than the politicians, e.g. the media and civil servants. In many 
countries, the budget and treasury officers had encountered significant challenges in 
convincing the press and public of the need for public sector accruals in discharging 
governments’ accountability. The US Department of the Treasury (2010 & 2014) has, for 
instance, since the last decade been preparing a simplified version of financial statements for 
the citizens and press so as to elucidate them as to the financial health and long-term 
sustainability of the federal government. Accounting practitioners and standard setting 
institutions have envisaged the prevailing mismatch between accounting practices and the 
accounting education offered at higher education institutions as a major cause undermining 
users’/citizens capacity to apply accrual information. The following statement by a Technical 
Director of one standard setting institution during the 11th symposium illustrated this:  
“People do not have the proper education to tackle our work, so the question then is 
whether we need to adjust our definitions to what is being taught in our schools.” 
 
As stated by Lombrano & Zanin (2013), this is not surprising given the fact that the 
citizens are more interested in assessing the quality of public services rather than the 
information supplied by the financial statements. The proponents of accrual accounting are of 
the view that, albeit the visible costs of transition to accruals may appear large in absolute 
terms, they are relatively small when compared to the share of public expenditure in 
countries’ GDP (CIPFA, 2012). Heald & Georgios (2011), for instance, state that public 
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sector spending accounts for more than 40% per cent of the UK’s GDP. It is stated that the 
costs of poor decision-making resulting from incomplete cash information are much higher 
than the transition costs for accrual accounting. In its report, CIPFA (2012) states that many 
countries that are in pursuit of cash accounting have been developing additional systems and 
procedures by incurring substantial costs so as to manage their assets, liabilities, programmes 
and commitments. 
 
4.1.2. Technical challenges 
 
Several technical difficulties have been envisaged in implementing accrual accounting in 
the member states, in particular amongst the low and medium-intensity adopters. The public 
sector consists of a large number of assets and liabilities, for instance, heritage assets, 
military assets, infrastructure assets, and social insurance programs, which do not exist in the 
private sector (Blöndal, 2003, 2004). Of the technical challenges, a key challenge has been to 
decide whether there is a need to abandon the historical value used for the measurement of 
these assets and liabilities and to replace it with alternative valuation models such as market 
value, fair value and replacement cost. Replacing historical value with fair value has however 
been a challenging endeavour for many member states given the characteristics of such assets 
and obligations which seldom have any liquid and traceable markets. Many attendees 
representing the medium and low-intensity adopters were of the view that they would not 
indulge themselves in the market value discussion as it was not relevant to them. This was 
evident in the following comment made by a Deputy Director for Budget and Financial 
Planning at the Ministry of Finance of one medium-intensity-adopter at the 8th accrual 
symposium: 
“We have no intention to create a mess out of nothing. We will continue transaction-based 
historical costs rather than revaluing assets and liabilities by identifying their fair values.”  
 
The valuation problem has appeared to be more severe, however, for new accrual 
accounting adopters. The representatives of new adopters were aware of the fact that they are 
required to use marker/fair values for the recognition and measurement of their assets and 
liabilities once they accomplish their transition towards accruals. They were not however 
convinced that an active liquid market prevailed for many of their assets and that they were in 
a position to facilitate negotiate of their assets prices. During our informal talk, a Director 
General of the Treasury Bureau of one Asian country (a new adopter) mentioned how his 
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country had adopted a rather different approach to assets valuation, claiming it was a lesson 
learned from the experience of early adopters. He further stated at the 10th symposium: 
“We are following two steps for the evaluation of our assets prior to their inclusion in the 
statement of financial position. First, we undertake a physical inspection of the assets and 
calculate their acquisition costs. Next, we assign the values to our assets after having 
analysed the inspection and the replacement costs calculated.” 
 
Several low and medium-intensity adopters raised concerns as to whether they should 
determine revenues and expenses by identifying inflows and outflows applicable to a 
particular period or by considering changes in net assets. The early adopters of accruals 
seemed, however, positive in using the fair value approach to their assets measurement. 
Unlike the medium and low-intensity accrual adopters, a challenge encountered by the early 
adopters was to elucidate to politicians and citizens the fluctuations which they might 
experience in the financial statements every year due to the changes in the value of assets. 
Their major concern had been to stop politicians taking advantage of such short-falls and 
wind-falls resulting from the changes in assets valuation, and using them to increase or cut 
expenditure on other social programmes. 
 
The treatment of social insurance programmes has remained another contentious issue in 
most of the OECD member states, including the early adopters of public sector accruals. 
OECD (2002) states that there is a general consensus amongst the member states that 
contractual obligations such as government employees’ pension programmes should be 
treated as a liability and incorporated in the statement of financial position. It has been argued 
that such programmes could be an enormous future obligation for the member states given 
the circumstances of an ageing population. However, we noticed that only a few member 
states had considered social insurance programmes a liability, in particular pensions. Given 
that pension plans had been funded on a pay-as-you-go basis in many countries, attendees 
representing the medium and low-intensity accrual adopters were of the view that there was 
no need to recognise such social insurance programmes as a liability and that these 
programmes could be adjusted in notes just for the sake of ensuring transparency.  
 
Similarly, we noted an increasing trend of public private partnerships (PPPs) amongst 
countries in the OECD, not only to achieve improved value for money (VFM), but also to 
meet their fiscal targets (Demirag, Khadaroo, Stapleton, & Stevenson, 2012; Demirag, 
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Khadaroo, Stapleton, & Stevenson, 2011). However, many OECD member countries have yet 
to recognise PPPs as part of their contingent liabilities and incorporate them in financial 
statements. The proponents of public sector accruals argue that the exclusion of PPPs in the 
financial statements would expose governments to the risk of unplanned debt at the expense 
of future generations (Araujo & Sutherland, 2010). Discussions were held as to whether and 
to what extent the ongoing PPP projects in the member countries had been successful in 
terms of transferring risks, delivering value for money and providing cost savings. 
Elucidating the challenges with regard to the PPP projects, a Deputy Director for Budget at 
the Federal Financial Administration of a medium-intensity accrual adopter stated at the 10th 
symposium: 
“Different standards have imposed different requirements for the accounting of PPPs (see 
IFRIC 12, IPSAS 32, and Eurostat). We do not have standard guidance to define the PPP 
projects and identify the associated risks in our statements.” 
 
In addition to PPPs, the representatives of several OECD member states highlighted the 
challenges they had dealt with measuring and reporting of non-cash items (such as 
depreciation, impairment, scenarios and discounting rates). The treatment of non-cash items 
had seemingly led the member states to two kinds of difficulties, namely accuracy and 
volatility. This was evident in the following assertion made by a Chief Accounting Advisor at 
the Treasury of an early adopter at the 10th symposium: 
“Our biggest problem is to cope with the frequent changes in prices and costs and the 
impacts they have on forecasts, estimates, and appropriations. We are in a dilemma when 
calculating depreciations, selecting discounting rates and forecasting tax revenues.” 
 
On the whole, we have observed in the OECD that the accrual-based accounting has been 
accepted not only at the economic and political level, but also at the organisational-field and 
organisational levels (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). At the 
economic and political level, the European Commission and the OECD have envisaged the 
adoption of public sector accruals as a means through which to ensure the accountability and 
transparency of public sector entities in the light of the sovereign debt crisis (European 
Commission, 2012, 2013; Blöndal, 2003). Albeit not mentioned explicitly, these institutions 
have seemingly made the adoption of public sector accruals an institutional signal that may 
be regarded almost like an entry condition for their membership (see e.g. Ernst & Young, 
2012). This clearly indicates that many of the OECD member states are subject to coercive 
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and normative pressures being exerted for the adoption of accrual accounting. There are also 
differences in the opinions of the actors with regard to accruals, depending upon the group of 
the country. While the treasury officers in early adopters are more concerned over elucidating 
the importance of accrual accounting to politicians and citizens, the majority of the budget 
officers, accountants and policy makers representing the low and medium-intensity adopters 
have given more emphasis to handling the political and technical ambiguities inherent to 
accrual accounting. 
 
4.2. Significance of accrual budgeting  
 
Accrual budgeting is defined as “the specification of budgetary expenditure authorisations 
and revenue estimates in terms of accrual accounting measures” (Robinson, 2009:4). Unlike 
the cash budget which is focused on the forecast and allocation of cash, accrual budget 
forecasts and demonstrates resources raised and consumed by the governments, and the 
manner in which obligations are incurred and settled. We have observed that discussions on 
various aspects of accrual budgeting and its implementation in the OECD member states 
were being held since the first annual OECD accrual accounting symposium. The fact that 
only three member states, i.e. Australia, New Zealand, and the UK have adopted full accruals 
for appropriations in the last decade clearly shows that there is far less acceptance of accruals 
for the budgeting purpose than for financial reporting (Blöndal, 2003, 2015; Bergmann, 2012; 
Schick, 2007). Six member states, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, Chile and 
Iceland, have in recent years introduced some degree of accruals in their appropriations, but 
they have excluded several important elements in the budget, for instance, the projection of 
public service pensions and the capitalisation of their assets (Blöndal, 2015). Such a lack of 
interest amongst member states to instigate accrual budgeting reforms is also evident in the 
bulk of academic work (Marti, 2006; Jones, Lande, Luder, & Portal, 2013; Brusca, 
Montesinos, & Chow, 2013).  
 
As is the case in accrual accounting, there are both political and technical factors involved 
stifling the advancement of accruals for appropriations in the member states. The former 
however appears more dominating in the case of accrual budgeting. In most countries 
budgeting is not a system of forecasting, but a method to democratically decide on the 
authorisation to spend financial resources and to collect (mainly) taxes. Brusca, Montesinos, 
& Chow (2013) mention that the budget has in many central European countries been central 
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to their legal administrative culture. The legislators and politicians in many of these countries 
have envisaged accrual budgeting more as a caveat jeopardising the budget discipline and 
posing a substantial risk in the discharging of public accountability. They have had a view 
that only through cash budget would they be able to meet their parliamentary obligation, 
which is to demonstrate that the money they are allowed to spend matches the amounts 
reported in the budget. A Deputy Director of the State Budget Department at the Ministry of 
Finance of a medium-intensity accruals adopter remarked at the 8th symposium: 
“National budget and final accounts are also subject to parliamentary approval in our 
country. We have been preparing financial statements under [the] accrual basis of 
accounting voluntarily. We have however no intention to prepare accrual budgeting. Cash 
basis budgeting has advantages in terms of certainty, objectivity, and accessibility, of 
course if it is properly managed.” 
 
The fact that techniques such as accrual budgeting tend to weaken the legislature’s control 
over the executive government means that the legislature should be ready to accept the shifts 
in the balance of power (Newberry, 2015; Jones, Lande, Luder, & Portal, 2013). We observed 
that although the administrators in a number of low and medium-intensity adopters had 
positive opinions towards accrual budgeting, political support to accrual budgeting was rather 
weak. As is the case in accrual accounting, key actors at the organisational level primarily 
representing the low and medium-intensity adopters reiterated during the symposiums the 
view that the adoption of accrual budgeting would be easier in those countries in which the 
legislature has limited influence in the budget process. It has been argued that without the 
operational freedom to decide on the input mix for delivering public services, the adoption of 
accrual budging would be of little use in improving financial administration (Blöndal, 2003; 
USGAO, 2000). This was evident during our observation at the 10th symposium. A Senior 
Advisor for the Ministry of Finance in a Scandinavian country (a medium-intensity adopter 
of accruals) stated: 
“We know that a key element in accrual budgeting is to provide agencies [with] freedom 
in managing their expenditures. Our agencies are less controlled and we have provided 
them with an extended authority to incur their expenditures. Expenditure management is 
now more an element of management than a political issue in our country. We will have to 




There are several cases in which the adoption of accrual budgeting has been dropped due 
to a lack of pressure being exerted by politicians at the organisational-field level. Norway and 
the Netherlands are two examples in this regard. In 2009, the Ministry of Finance, 
Netherlands, had undertaken comparative international research to unfold the international 
experience in accrual budgeting and accounting (see e.g. Brusca, Caperchione, Cohen, & 
Rossi, 2015). Implicit in the findings of the research was that accrual budgeting could be a 
costly and time-consuming process and that the provision of information to the parliament 
could easily be improved without implementing accruals for line ministries. As a result, only 
agencies, which were business-like parts of the government, were considered suitable for the 
adoption of accrual accounting and budgeting. In a similar vein, Norway had appointed a 
commission to study the feasibility of accrual accounting and budgeting in 2007 (Gårseth-
Nesbakk, 2011). The commission members were in favour of giving continuity to the cash 
principle given that agencies were being regulated on the basis of inputs control.  
 
In its report, the United States General Accounting Office (USGAO) (2000) states that 
there are views in many OECD member states that budgeting on a basis other than cash runs 
the risk of becoming a purely technical accounting exercise, which in turn, may demand a 
more sophisticated understanding of accounting standards and underlying assumptions. In 
fact, such technical ambiguities have appeared to be a factor which has led some member 
states to perceive accrual budgeting a part of rather than a complete solution in improving 
their public accountability. Representatives of a number of medium-intensity adopters have 
held a view that accrual budgeting could be a good mechanism for civil servants to enhance 
operational management by recognising the full cost of certain programmes. However, they 
are of the opinion that it could not be used for recognising longer-term fiscal challenges 
driven by factors such as an aging population and increasing health costs. The representatives 
of many member states (mainly from central Europe) alluded, during our observations, to 
how a range of benefits, for instance, improved asset registers, fiscal transparency and 
outcome measurement (to name just a few) could be achieved through accrual accounting and 
reporting, while keeping the appropriations on the cash basis. A Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Treasury Department of a medium-intensity adopter remarked at the 10th symposium: 
“We have continued to measure budget authority and outlays on a cash-and-obligation 
basis, except for some items such as credit programmes, certain interest payments, some 
federal employee pensions and some retiree health care. [A] cash budget with some accrual 
modifications can be a more pragmatic approach to us.” 
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When considering accrual budgeting the discussion is not anymore on how much money 
would be spent, but on how much costs (accruals) might be realised. Costs are allocated and 
charged and thus discussions about the allocation mechanisms arise, whereas in budget 
accounting, despite possible disagreements, the discussion is only about the money to be 
spent or collected. We observed that the majority of low and medium-intensity adopters were 
concerned over their capacity to allocate costs and to reap the perceived benefits of accrual 
budgeting as mentioned by its propagators (Blöndal, 2004). A Deputy Director General of the 
Budget Department representing a group of the low-intensity adopters commented at the 8th 
symposium: 
“For this change [accrual budgeting] to take place, we first need to train and educate our 
budget managers. We do not have appropriate valuation rules or IT infrastructure in place. 
We also need to change our focus, which is at the moment on improving the balance sheet 
and surplus. We are probably quite a way away from meeting the requirements of accrual 
budgeting.” 
 
Jones & Lüder (2011) claim that a lack of absorptive capacity was evident amongst 
German federal governments, as many of them had to reverse their decision to consider 
accruals-based budgeting. Resolving the costs allocation issues and handling technical 
ambiguities inherited to accrual budgeting had been further complicated due to the absence of 
a standard procedures and guidance to prepare accrual budgeting. As is the case in accrual 
accounting, there is apparently no single way of doing accrual budgeting even amongst the 
high-intensity adopters. The USGAO (2000:19), for instance, shows the variations that 
countries have adopted in measuring the government-wide deficit/surplus in their accrual 
appropriations. While New Zealand reports its deficit/surplus using the accrual-based net 
operating results, Australia has introduced a “fiscal balance” measure by adjusting the 
accrual-based operating balance with the cash-and-other-national-investment-to-savings gap. 
Claims have also been made that the full costs, especially the long-term costs, have often 
been underestimated by the countries that had adopted accrual budgeting.  
 
In a similar vein, there were issues with regard to the transparency of accrual budgeting 
over borrowing and debt management. A key dilemma that a number of low and medium-
intensity adopters had faced was to set up expenses and expenditure limits for agencies and 
provide them with the authority to shift limits from one item to another; the problem 
envisaged was an increase in the total debt level resulting from such shifts. In addition, the 
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member states were remained sceptical about the lack of the fiscal strategy in accrual 
budgeting. Commenting on his country’s view on accrual budgeting at the 11th symposium, a 
Public Account Officer representing the Ministry of Finance of a low-intensity adopter stated: 
“Accrual appropriations do not present the fiscal strategy. They just provide forecasts. For 
the government, such fiscal strategy communication is of the utmost importance for 
showing its priorities.”  
 
Standards setters, international organisations and professional accountants, i.e. the actors 
at the economic and political level (PwC, 2013; CIPFA, 2012), have however perceived 
accrual budgeting as an important component of broader public management reforms. 
Implicit in their assertions was that the adoption of accrual principles for reporting without 
similar use for budgeting would prevent countries reaping the advantages of accruals, and 
thereby improvements in their financial performance (see e.g. Ball, 2012; Blöndal, 2004). 
These organisations have presented accrual budgeting as a means through which to improve 
both operational management and external reporting. Accrual budgeting can be used 
internally for management support and undertaking effective management decisions, because 
it has the potential to link the total cost of resources being used to the performance achieved 
from those resources (USGAO, 2000). Such information is vital for the introduction of 
performance-focused management in the public sector. Similarly, mentions are made that 
accrual budgeting would help improve external reporting by delineating the longer-term 
implications of current decisions. The fact that it addresses annual changes in assets and 
liabilities means that public entities would be able to undertake better decisions with respect 
to the acquisition, disposal and maintenance of fixed assets (Robinson, 2009). In addition, 
they would have better incentives to identify and sell those non-financial assets that are 
reckoned to be non-beneficial by the incorporation of depreciation in the expense budget.  
 
We observed during the symposiums that the high-intensity adopters had echoed similar 
supportive voices with regard to the importance and benefits of accrual budgeting in the 
public sector. Their countries were of the view that, for engendering the benefits of improved 
awareness of the financial impacts of their decisions, improved asset management, and 
improved risk assessment, the integration of the reporting with the budget process was a 
prerequisite. A Head of Government Internal Audit Profession at the Treasury of one high-
intensity accrual adopter expressed his view on accrual budgeting at the 10th symposium: 
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“We do not regret our decision to implement accrual budgeting along with financial 
reporting. If we were given a choice, we would do it again.”  
 
During our observations, we witnessed a clear division amongst the actors at 
organisational-field and organisational levels regarding the importance and applicability of 
accrual budgeting in their specific jurisdictions. The budget has remained a means of 
governance in many central European countries, and the politicians and legislators in these 
countries are seemingly not willing to facilitate changes in the budget system. The coercive 
pressures for the member countries to embrace accrual budgeting have therefore been weak 
(Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Indeed, some agencies and 
administrators of the low and medium-intensity adopters of accruals have supported accrual 
budgeting for internal purposes, i.e. operation management. Many of them, however, are yet 
to be convinced of the merits of its adoption as well as of their capacity to implement accrual 
budgeting for external reporting purposes. The early adopters of accruals are the main 
supporters and the carriers of accrual budgeting ideas. These countries, together with other 
propagators at the institutional level in particular the European Commission, the IFAC, and 
professional accounting firms, have doubted the usefulness of accruals for financial reporting 
without its corresponding adoption for appropriations. The European Commission (2012) has 
mentioned that the proposed EPSASs would incorporate standards both for financial 
reporting and appropriations. It can therefore be argued that the institutional pressures being 
exerted on to the member states for the adoption for accrual budgeting may possibly 
strengthen in the future. 
 
 4.3. The applicability of IPSASs 
 
The extent public sector accounting literature demonstrates that the IPSASs have failed to 
address the requirements of most of the central European and OECD governments in which 
public finance is centred around the annual budget (Benito, Brusca, & Montesinos, 2007; 
Christiaens, Reyniers, & Rolle, 2010; Pina & Torres, 2003; Pina, Torres, & Yetano, 2009). In 
many of these countries, the IPSASs are seen more as encompassing the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition of public sector accounting in which the financial statements are separated from the 
budgeting information and prepared to cater to the needs of the public in respect to large 
resource suppliers (Brusca, Montesinos, & Chow, 2013). The fact that Australia, New 
Zealand and the UK have adopted IFRSs for their public sectors with certain amendments 
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(i.e. a sector-neutral approach), and that their existing public sector accounting standards are 
considered closest to the IPSASs epitomises this. Ernst & Young (2012), for instance, states 
that the UK accounting standards are more than 95% compliant with the IPSASs.  
 
We have noted during our observations that a number of EU and OECD member states, 
for instance, Italy and Slovakia, have expressed concerns over the lack of public-sector-
specific provisions in the IPSASs for recognising and measuring pension liabilities, social 
benefits, tax revenues and historical costs (see also Ernst & Young, 2012; European 
Commission, 2012). The IPSASs are envisaged in these countries as too theoretical, complex, 
incomplete and costly approaches to streamlining their public sector accounting. In its 
assessment report, the European Commission (2012) has pointed out several critical issues 
relating to IPSASs, for instance, the governance of the IPSASB, the relationship between the 
IPSASs and the European Systems of Accounts and the ‘left out of budgeting’, amongst 
others, and clarified that the IPSASs cannot be implemented in EU member states as they 
currently stand. Using the IPSASs as a starting reference, the European Commission (2013) 
has made a recommendation for the development of a set of harmonised public sector 
accounting and budgeting standards, i.e. EPSASs. This trend towards the EPSASs has 
certainly become a caveat, warning not only against the suitability of the IPSASs but also 
against their future adoption by other EU and OECD member states. During our informal 
discussions at the 10th symposium, a Budget Secretary of one medium-intensity adopter from 
North Europe remarked: 
“We have critically reviewed all IPSASs in my country for seven years. They have the 
specific advantage of being an Anglo-Saxon approach and can be used for the programmes 
and projects of the IMF and other lenders/investors in developing nations. They could not 
meet the reporting requirements of Europe.” 
 
Prior studies on public sector accounting in emerging countries have delineated an 
increasing trend amongst these countries to adopt the IPSASs, as part of their attempt at 
mimicking best practices adopted by international organisations and Western countries 
(Adhikari, Kuruppu, & Matilal, 2013; Harun, Peursem, & Eggleton, 2012). We noticed 
during our observations that there was an absence of such mimetic pressure (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) being exerted to the OECD member states to instigate a step towards the 
IPSASs. A Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Finance of one Scandinavian country (a 
medium-intensity adopter) stated at the 10th symposium: 
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“For instance, Norway has not made the adoption of the IPSASs compulsory. Sweden 
adopted accrual accounting in an era prior to the IPSASs. Yes, we are encouraged to adopt 
and extend the use of accrual accounting but there is no such pressure/persuasion to adopt 
the IPSASs.” 
 
Representatives of several medium-intensity adopters and new accrual adopters were of 
the view that their annual reports in some ways corresponded to the IPSASs in terms of the 
basic principles and definitions of accounting elements being used. They raised several 
conflicting and technical issues during our informal talks however, which they claimed would 
be an impediment had they wished to fully converge with the IPSASs. A Treasury Head at 
the Ministry of Strategy and Finance of a new adopter commented at the 11th symposium that 
his department amended several IPSASs, including employee benefits, financial instruments, 
borrowing costs and segment reporting, to eliminate alternatives available in the standards 
and reduce the complexity. Another senior budget officer representing a medium-intensity 
adopter from northern Europe mentioned the hesitation in his country to adopt the IPSASs by 
pointing to the asset-liability model implied in the standards, with an emphasis on fair value 
and market prices. The fact that his country had adhered to a revenue-expense model 
anchored on, amongst other things, historical costs, the prudence principle and the income 
sheet approach meant that the IPSASs were simply irrelevant. Illustrating the inapplicability 
of the IPSASs, the same budget officer commented at the 10th symposium: 
“IPSAS 19 does not provide any reason to alter the present valuation model of financial 
assets as stipulated in our budget decree.” 
 
In a similar vein, mention was also made by several participants about a lack of provision 
to address the main intangible asset inherent to government, i.e. the power to levy taxes. A 
number of participants, in particular from central European countries, were critical about the 
requirements as laid down in IPSASs 28-30 for financial instruments. There were also 
concerns over the inadequacy of the IPSASs in dealing with non-exchange transaction 
expenses, i.e. taxes and transfers, employee benefits, public debt and government revenues. 
For instance, non-exchange transaction expenses had been the main expense within their 
central governments and some other public entities; there were however no IPSASs available 
for those expenses. In addition, IPSAS 23 had turned out be irrelevant in many of these 
European governments given that their revenue sources had been very broad rather than 
defined in the standard. Similarly, IPSAS 29 appeared inapplicable in that many of these 
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countries did not have a developed system that could separate commissions and expenses for 
their public debt.  
 
We noticed during our observation that two key issues/requirements relating to the 
IPSASs, i.e. conceptual framework and whole government accounts (WGAs), had drawn the 
particular attention of the majority of the OECD member states. Having spent nine years and 
eight public consultations with the global constituency, the IPSASB has recently approved its 
“Conceptual Framework for General Purpose Financial Reporting by Public Sector 
Entities” (Christiaens & Vandendriessche, 2015). The IPSASB claims that the framework 
has been developing by giving a special attention to specific public sector-related issues, and 
that it would provide a basis for preparing high-quality reports for both accountability and 
decision-making purposes. During our informal conversations at the 11th symposium, the 
Chairman of the IPSASB remarked: 
“The concept of accountability is very important in the public sector. Our objective is 
therefore not simply to interpret the IASB framework but to develop our own framework 
using the work of the IASB and others as appropriate. We have also considered several 
public sector-specific issues while developing the framework, for instance, involuntary 
transfers and non-exchange transactions, budget approval, the nature of public sector 
programmes, and the purpose of assets in the public sector.” 
 
However, evidence shows that the notion of government control used in the conceptual 
framework has proved problematic in a range of countries, including Australia, New Zealand 
and Spain, amongst others (Brusca & Motesions, 2009). The accountability mechanisms in 
the public sector are primarily focused on the use of budget appropriations and on the 
services provided and effects achieved from the point of ‘value for money’. This also means 
that the budgets statements and performance reporting, rather than the general purpose 
financial statements as prescribed in by the IPSASs, would continue to form a basis for 
discharging accountability in the public sector. Furthermore, questions have been raised 
about the way the users of financial statements have been identified in the conceptual 
framework. The citizens, resource providers, legislators, and other service recipients and their 
representatives have been reckoned to be the key users of the financial statements in the 
public sector, without any actual interviews or field work having been undertaken to specify 




A major issue that the participants had raised, however, concerns the delay by the IPSAB 
in developing the framework. Views were expressed that the framework would have been 
introduced prior to the issuance of standards rather than when the standards are fully 
developed. Another related matter that we noted during the symposiums was the challenges 
that the members had encountered in identifying and defining accounting entities, a key 
requirement of the WGA. It is explicitly mentioned in IPSAS 6 that the consolidated financial 
statements should comprise all economic entities, i.e. controlling entities and any controlled 
entities. The challenge in identifying controlled entities has led many OECD and EU 
countries to exclude local governments, universities and state-controlled banks from their 
consolidated statements (Brusca & Montesions, 2009). The WGAs of the UK central 
government perhaps serve as an illustration (Hyndman & Connolly, 2011). The first audited 
WGA for the UK government, which was published for the fiscal year 2009-2010, 
aggregated the accounts of around 1,500 public entities. In its recent WGA for 2013-2014 
published in March 2015, the UK Treasury has aggregated the accounts of 5,400 public 
entities (HM Treasury, 2015). Although the UK’s WGAs are considered to be the world’s 
largest consolidation exercise (Chow, Humphrey, & Moll, 2009; Heald & Geogriou, 2011), 
there are still many entities which may fall within the category of public entities, for instance, 
the Crown Estate, the Electoral Commission and the Independent Parliamentary Standards 
Authority, to name but a few, that are yet to have been brought under its scope.  
 
What we noticed during our informal discussions with the representatives of OECD 
member states, however, was that the consolidated statements of some countries have 
eschewed not only certain public entities but also a number of important accounting 
items/transactions. A Senior Audit Director at the National Audit Office in a Scandinavian 
country (medium-intensity adopter) stated at the 8th symposium: 
“The central government uses the equity method for consolidation, but the IPSASs require 
a complete consolidation line by line. Not all units controlled by the government are 
therefore consolidated in the WGA. The central government does not consolidate the 
general pension funds either. There are no provisions for segment reporting.” 
 
As stated previously, although accrual accounting has been introduced in the majority of 
OECD member states, only a few countries have applied it to cover all sectors of the 
government, for instance, central government, local government and agencies. One reason for 
the exclusion of certain public entities in the consolidation has been the use of a variety of 
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accounting policies and principles at different government levels. While the narrow scope of 
the WGA had been a key issue among medium and low-intensity adopters, the high-intensity 
adopters were more concerned over the issue of materiality in preparing the WGA. They 
were seemingly more focused on increasing the usefulness of the WGA by alienating intra-
government transactions and identifying the elements/issues that could potentially pose a 
threat to their public finance in the longer-term. A Senior Specialist at the Treasury of one 
high-intensity adopter commented at the 8th symposium: 
“We are asked by the public accounts committee to make better use of the WGA. We have 
given special attention to demonstrating the risks that our nuclear decommission and 
clinical negligence provisions, pension liabilities, long-term discount rates, and 
outstanding tax and tax written off may pose in the future while developing the WGA.” 
 
In the case of the IPSASs, we have noticed that the key actors at the macro level (i.e. the 
economic and political level) are to a large extent divided, which, in turn, has undermined the 
degree of pressures being exerted to the OECD member states for their adoption. The 
European Commission and the OECD are of the view that the IPSASs cannot be 
implemented in Europe in their present form, and are advancing a project to develop a 
separate set of accrual based standards (the EPSASs) for Europe. The fact that there are no 
institutional pressures being exerted onto the member states for the adoption of the IPSASs 
has raised concern over their applicability in OECD and EU member states. Prior studies 
have delineated how a lack of institutional pressures stifle the adoption and implementation 
of public sector accounting reforms (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Hyndman & Connolly, 2011; 
Pollanen & Loiselle-Lapointe, 2012). This is evident in the following statement made by a 
Budget Officer of a medium-intensity adopter during our informal talks at the 11th 
symposium:  
“Unless we are faced with coercive pressure and legislation from the EU, no other force 
can compel us to adopt the IPSASs.” 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Drawing on the ideas of extended new-institutional theory, we have in this study sought to 
explore the major challenges involved in implementing public sector accruals in OECD 
member states. In particular, we have adopted the three-layer organisational structures of 
Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman (2004), and investigated the ways in which, and to what extent, 
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the ideas and practices of accrual accounting, accrual budgeting and IPSASs have cascaded 
down from the OECD to member countries at the organisational-field level and then to public 
sector accountants, policy makers and budget officers (i.e. key actors at the organisational 
level) in individual member states. On top of our structural hierarchy, i.e. the economic and 
political level, there are organisations such the OECD, the European Commission, the 
IPSASB and the IMF. These organisations have evolved as dominant institutional players 
taking the role of regulators and experts in the field of public sector accounting. Together 
with the international accounting and auditing firms, they are involved in propagating to their 
members the importance and needs of public sector accruals.  
 
We have noted that the views relating to accrual accounting, budgeting and IPSASs are 
divided among the member states. Not only are there variations among the member states in 
terms of adopting and implementing public sector accruals, which is also illustrated in the 
extant academic work and the reports of international organisations, standards setters and 
policy makers (IFAC, 2011; PwC, 2013; European Commission, 2012; Guthrie, Olson, & 
Humphrey, 1999), there are differences in the ways the countries have perceived the 
importance of these reforms in their jurisdictions. In general, accrual accounting and 
reporting has been more accepted by the member states (i.e. at the organisational-field level), 
as compared to accrual budgeting and the IPSASs; and that the members are apparently 
convinced of the merits of accrual accounting and reporting to varying degrees and at some 
levels, if not at all government levels, i.e. central government, state and local government and 
social security funds (European Commission, 2012; Guthrie, Olson, & Humphrey, 1999; 
Blöndal, 2003, 2004). This is illustrated by the fact that almost all member states, except 
perhaps Israel, Mexico, and Slovenia (see e.g. Blöndal, 2015), have either adopted some 
elements of accruals for reporting at their different government levels or are providing 
supplementary accruals information for statistics along with cash information (see Appendix 
B).  
 
The support of accounting profession and firms, standards setters, and policy makers as 
actors at the economic and political level to accrual accounting envisages the normative 
pressures being exerted to the member states. Organisations such as the European 
Commission, the OECD and the IMF have given a particular attention to the financial 
positions of their member states in the evolving sovereign debt crisis. Reporting of balance 
sheet items such as liabilities and obligations that require substantial cash resources in the 
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future (e.g. public sector pensions) have now become important for the member states (Ernst 
& Young, 2012; European Commission, 2012). The ways in which accrual accounting is 
being promoted across the countries – not least in the OECD – as, for instance, a panacea of 
future financial crisis (see e.g. Ball, 2012) and a tool for high quality statistics (i.e. the GFS 
and the ESA) (see e.g. European Commission, 2012, 2013), certainly delineates the potency 
of coercive pressures, as shown in the extent institutional-based studies (Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001; Adhikari, Kuruppu, & Matilal, 2013; Irvine, 2008; Ball & Craig, 2010; Hyndman & 
Connolly, 2011). Mimetic pressure has clearly become a driving force for the new adopters 
encouraging them to declare a big-bang approach towards public sector accruals (Ernst & 
Young, 2012). 
 
Our findings demonstrate that most if not all OECD member states have underestimated 
the complexity in implementing accrual accounting and therefore ended up spending more 
time, resources and effort on its adoption than originally planned. We argue that a rosy 
picture of accrual accounting has been presented to countries without giving much attention 
to its applicability at their organisational level. In propagating the benefits of accrual 
accounting, less attention has been paid on the competence and capacity of treasury and 
budget officers and policy makers, the key actors at the organisational level, who are actually 
involved in realising the propagated benefits of public sector accruals in their specific 
contexts. We have noted that many of these organisational actors, whether early or low and 
medium-intensity adopters, have been struggling to convince the citizens and to some extent 
the politicians of the importance of public sector accruals, and how the benefits of accrual 
accounting can overweigh the costs of pursuing cash accounting in an era of budget cuts. 
Challenges in elucidating the fluctuations to politicians, led by the changes in the assets 
values and estimations and preventing them to take advantages of such changes by 
prioritising or dropping other social programmes, have remained intact.  
 
We have observed that several low and medium-intensity and new adopters have been 
exposed to a number of political and technical dilemmas in the process of implementing 
accrual accounting. Not only are the politicians particularly reticent to delegate their financial 
decision-making power to agencies, the budget and treasury officers in many of these 
countries are encountering technical ambiguities in areas such as assets valuation, identifying 
social insurance programmes, and recognising and reporting contingent liabilities and other 
non-cash items. The varied ways that these organisational actors have understood and 
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addressed those contentious issues have led to further diversity in implementing accrual 
accounting. New adopters have even been forced to abandon their big-bang approach to 
reforms, putting more emphasis on the adoption of accrual accounting at the central level. As 
stated in prior-institutional-based work (Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen, Lapsley, & Pallot, 
2007; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; Hyndman & Connolly, 2011; Pollanen & Loiselle-
Lapointe, 2012), the adoption of accrual accounting in many of these countries (low and 
medium-intensity and new adopters) has seemingly been driven by their desire to cope with 
external/institutional pressure, and the interests and competence of organisational actors have 
often been marginalised and understated in the process.  
 
The empirical evidence that we have presented clearly shows an increase in the 
institutional pressures being exerted onto the OECD member states for the adoption of 
accrual budgeting. Accrual budgeting is perhaps an area within public sector accruals in 
which the differences in the opinion of actors both at organisational-field and organisational 
levels are most striking. Only the early adopters are ostensibly convinced by the benefits of 
adopting full accrual budgeting as propagated by the European Commission, the IFAC and 
accounting firms (European Commission, 2012; PwC, 2013). The latter group is of the view 
that, without the subsequent adoption of accruals for appropriations, the benefits of accrual 
accounting would be negated in that the politicians would continue to give more attention to 
the budget. This increasing disintegration between accounting and budgeting has been 
envisaged as a cause of unintended consequences in public sector accruals. We argue that 
accrual budgeting requires more agreement from politicians and parliamentarians, i.e. 
decision-makers at the organisational-field level, than does accrual accounting, which is a 
system of recording not of decision-making. Given the key role of the budget in discharging 
accountability in many low-intensity adopters, mainly the central European countries, it is 
rather unrealistic to think that the politicians in these countries, who are hesitant even to 
delegate the required authorities to agencies for accrual reporting, would accept accrual 
budgeting, which requires them to abandon their power over financial decision-making (i.e. 
budget). Mention is made by budget and treasury officers in some medium-intensity adopters 
that accrual budgeting can be an effective tool for ascertaining costs of certain programmes. 
The adoption of full accruals for appropriations by recognising their longer-term fiscal 




In a similar vein, we have demonstrated that the applicability of IPSASs has remained 
another contentious issue within public sector accruals. The key actors at the political and 
economic level have uttered divided positions undermining the potency of institutional 
pressures being exerted to the member states for the adoption of IPSASs. The fact that the 
early adopters have adhered to a sector-neutral approach, i.e. IFRSs with or without 
modifications at all levels (see e.g. Ryan, Guthrie, & Day, 2007), implies that their 
accounting standards are relatively converged with the IPSASs, which have made trivial the 
issue of their adoption in their specific jurisdictions. Views shared by a number of low and 
medium-intensity adopters were that the IPSASs are meant for emerging nations given the 
lack of standards in these countries, and that most of the IPSASs are to be revised as to make 
them applicable in their jurisdictions. Ambiguities in defining entities and incorporating them 
in the WGA, and the issues such as governance of the IPSASB, a lack of conceptual 
framework and a proposal of EPSASs have all made the IPSASs less attractive among the 
budget and treasury officers in the low and medium-intensity adopters. 
 
On the whole, we argue that the implementation of public sector accruals across countries, 
and the challenges that the countries have encountered in the process, have been much 
broader than outlined in the academic work and presented in the reports/studies of the 
proponents. All these political and technical ambiguities inherited to public sector accruals 
when cascaded down to the organisational level have brought about vast uncertainty and 
confusion amongst most of the budget and treasury officers who deal with public sector 
accruals in their specific jurisdictions, threatening the legitimacy at the organisational level. 
Our empirical findings bear witness to the key role held by the organisational actors, which 
extends far beyond discussions of organisational legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or 
decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Much of the new-institutionalism based work has 
oversimplified the inner work of organisations, effectively – albeit implicitly – treating them 
as well-functioning legitimacy machines (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004). Making heard 
the voices of organisational actors, i.e. policy makers, accountants and budget officers of the 
OECD member states, with regard to the need and implementation of public sector accruals 
in their specific contexts, we have therefore contributed to this stream of literature. In 
addition, this insight also questions the important role of the macro factors heralded in recent 
publications (Pollanen & Loiselle-Lapointe, 2012; Hyndman, Liguori, Meyer, Polzer, Rota, 
& Seiwald, 2014) regarding countries’ accounting reforms. It has, for instance, been pointed 
out that a country’s cultural climate, political orientation, economic performance and 
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government size represent important determinants of a more accepting environment for 
accrual accounting. These factors could of course facilitate such an environment, but it seems 
overly simple to assume that the macro level factors could be vital factors in countries’ 
reform implementations or compliance. This paper therefore calls for the need to establish 
more communication and cooperation amongst the actors at the economic and political, 
organisational-field and organisational levels to build a coherent body of knowledge in public 
sector accruals. This could make it easier to tackle the complexity of public sector accruals 
and develop solutions that are aligned with the specific context of the public sector. Such 
cooperation could also be a point of departure to public sector accounting harmonisation, an 
emerging notion in the public sector. 
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AUSTRALIA  7 June 1971 
AUSTRIA  29 September 1961 
BELGIUM   13 September 1961 
CANADA   10 April 1961 
CHILE   7 May 2010 
CZECH REPUBLIC   21 December 1995 
DENMARK   30 May 1961 
ESTONIA  9 December 2010 
FINLAND   28 January 1969 
FRANCE   7 August 1961 
GERMANY   27 September 1961 
GREECE   27 September 1961 
HUNGARY   7 May 1996 
ICELAND   5 June 1961 
IRELAND   17 August 1961 
ISRAEL   7 September 2010 
ITALY   29 March 1962 
JAPAN   28 April 1964 
KOREA  12 December 1996 
LUXEMBOURG   7 December 1961 
MEXICO   18 May 1994 
NETHERLANDS   13 November 1961 
NEW ZEALAND   29 May 1973 
NORWAY   4 July 1961 
POLAND   22 November 1996 
PORTUGAL   4 August 1961 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC   14 December 2000 
SLOVENIA  21 July 2010 
SPAIN   3 August 1961 
SWEDEN  28 September 1961 
SWITZERLAND   28 September 1961 
TURKEY  2 August 1961 
UNITED KINGDOM  2 May 1961 






Public sector accruals in the OECD member states (see e.g. Blöndal, 2015) 

















Austria (financial reporting and budget) 
Belgium (financial reporting and budget) 
Canada (financial reporting) 
Chile (financial reporting and budget) 
Czech (financial reporting) 
Denmark (financial reporting and budget) 
Estonia ( financial reporting and transitioning to accrual budget) 
Finland (financial reporting and some appropriations on accruals) 
France (financial reporting) 
Hungary (financial reporting) 
Iceland (financial reporting and budget)  
Latvia (financial reporting) 
Lithuania (financial reporting) 
Korea (financial reporting) 
Poland (financial reporting) 
Slovak republic (financial reporting) 
Spain (financial reporting) 
Sweden (financial reporting and running costs on accruals) 
Switzerland (financial reporting and budget) 
Turkey (financial reporting) 
United States (financial reporting and loan and guarantee programs on accruals) 
 
Some elements 
of accruals at 
their central 
government 
levels either for 
reporting and 






Greece (supplementary accrual information is provide for ESA 95) 
Ireland (supplementary accrual information is provide) 
Israel 
Italy (supplementary accrual information is provide) 
 
Japan (full accruals statements are also prepared although the cash is the legal 
basis) 
Luxembourg (supplementary accrual information is provide for ESA 95) 
Mexico 
Netherlands (agency reporting on accruals) 
Norway (supplementary accrual information is provide) 
Portugal (agency reporting on accruals) 
Slovenia 
Follow the 
cash basis at 
the central 











Brazil (transition to accrual accounting) 
China (transition to accrual accounting) 
South Africa (transition to IPSASs) 
 
 
 
 
